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I. INTRODUCTION
In November of 1978, the Cost Accounting Standards Board
(CASB) solicited responses from the academic community,
government agencies, government contractors, and professional
organizations in connection with a study relating to the
treatment of capacity-related costs for contract costing
purposes. The Board's inquiry was in the form of an "issues
paper" whereby respondents were given the opportunity to




The purpose of this thesis is to examine the subjects of
capacity and capacity-related costs from both a theoretical
and a pragmatic standpoint to determine the feasibility and
desirability of a formal standard on capacity-related costs.
In addition to the feasibility/desirability question,
specific subsidiary issues of the CASB issues paper will be
examined with appropriate conclusions drawn and recommend-
ations stated.
B. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The scope of the thesis will be limited by the fact that
the writer is attempting to simulate, in an individual effort,
the staff work of the Cost Accounting Standards Board. The
Board, of course, is staffed with experts in the areas of
7

accounting and government contracting; therefore, any
individual attempt to resolve a research question is severely
disadvantaged. On the positive side, however, Mr. Paul
McClenon, Project Director of the capacity-related costs
project for the CASE, was extremely helpful by providing
written and verbal information concerning the work of the
CASB, in general, and the capacity-related costs project,
specifically.
The paper, although not extremely technical in nature,
does require a background in or knowledge of accounting in
order to be understood properly. Government or contractor
experience in contracting matters is helpful, although not
completely essential, in understanding the various issues.
C. METHODOLOGY
The methodology employed in researching the subject is
basically the same as that employed by the Cost Accounting
Standards Board. A reason for even considering the project
was examined. Next, a literature survey was conducted and
theoretical concepts extracted when they appeared to be
pertinent to the issues. Included in this background
material is a chapter on the CASB itself. This section is
considered to be essential to the study since it is fund-
amentally the Board's work that is being emulated. Most
importantly, the responses of industry (i.e., government
contractors) to the issues paper along with the responses
of government agencies and those of professors of accounting
8

were examined and the data analyzed. At that point,
conclusions were reached and recommendations presented.
D. IMPORTANCE
Why is the subject of capacity-related costs worthy of
consideration for action by the CASB? What condition or
perceived inequity exists that warrants the considerable
expenditure of time and resources to research the issues?
Although not the sole cause, one factor is the current
situation in the aircraft industry. This industry, which
may be representative of many others essential to the
military well-being of the country, contains some disturbing
characteristics
.
A joint DOD/OMB study report, "U.S. Aircraft Industry:
Capacity Analysis and Policy Implications," was released
in January of 1977. Jaques Gansler was chairman of the
study group. The abstract of the report begins :
This study examined the question of overcapacity in
the U. S. aircraft industry. It found there is con-
siderable excess capacity in relation to realistic
requirements. The study also indicated such excess
capacity is costing the Department of Defense on the
order of $ /4-00 million per year £l8, abstract] .
In business terms, World War II made a market for
airplanes on which the aircraft companies grew strong.
After the war, the U. S. industry dominated world aircraft
sales, commercial and military, for the next generation.
Our national legacy from WW II was the industrial base to
support the prosperity this country has enjoyed ever since.
Government spending and risk tasking nurtured the infancy

of the great post war industries— atomic energy, plastics
and synthetics, computers, and jet propulsion, among others.
Every American benefitted in one way or another; however,
Americans are still paying dearly for this prosperity. We
are paying millions of dollars to maintain the unnecessary
capacity in the aircraft industry \_ 6 J.
Some aircraft companies have moved away from the military
market. Several companies have merged (McDonnell and Douglas)
and others were absorbed by huge conglomerates (North
American by Rockwell, Vought by LTV, Consolidated Vultee
by General Dynamics). But there are still twelve major
airplane manufacturers and five helicopter companies , all
bidding furiously for the available business. The problem
is that America has excess aircraft production capacity.
Even if two or three companies went out of business, the
industry would still have abundant extra capacity for the
future. As it is, the aircraft industry is roughly twice
as large as it needs to be to produce all the commercial
and military planes needed between now and 1990 [6 J. A
solution to this problem could be approached by either a
reduction of approximately one-half of the aircraft com-
panies or a dimunition of the existing capacity of each
company. The question, then, is whether a few large
companies or many smaller ones would be more efficient.
The Defense Department, as the principal customer,
pays for most of the cost of this excess capacity. Con-
servatively estimated, maintaining this excess eats up
10

$300 million to $500 million a year f 18 1 . This government
spending pays for unnecessary employees, for idle factories,
and for inflated costs of airplanes and helicopters which
are manufactured at inefficiently low production rates.
The expenditure of $300 million to $500 million annually
of the taxpayer's money for unnecessary productive capacity
certainly warrants at least an examination of the issues
of capacity-related costs. There may be ample justification
for a formal cost accounting standard on this subject.
11

II. THE COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD
Before determining the propriety of a standard for
capacity-related costs, a general understanding of the Cost
Accounting Standards Board, the promulgating agency, is
appropriate. The historical background, stated objectives,
and research techniques of the CASB are an integral part of
any discussion concerning proposed cost accounting standards.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The accounting profession, primarily through the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
and under pressure from the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), has
been promoting generally accepted accounting principles
for many years. Generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) are concerned primarily with reports of financial
condition and the results of a company's operations for a
specific period of time. Regulations of the SEC are con-
cerned primarily with reporting to the public the financial
condition of corporations, while IRS regulations are intended
to implement the tax laws of the federal government. Neither
GAAP nor the regulations of the government agencies provides
the necessary principles for contract costing purposes.
Prior to 1970, the provisions of section XV of the
Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) provided the only
general cost accounting guidance and procedures for defense
12

contracting. Unfortunately, their effectiveness was
impaired because (1) they made frequent references to
generally accepted accounting principles and/or regulations
of the IRS and (2) they lacked specific criteria for the
use of alternative accounting principles and indirect cost
allocation models [l^J. The lack of uniformity led
accounting personnel in the government to conclude that it
was costing millions of dollars in time and manpower to
unravel the myriad of cost accounting procedures used by the
thousands of contractors performing for the government. No
uniformity of accounting methods was observed, no consistency
existed, and, even for those procedures which were similar,
there were decided differences of interpretation for key
terms used within the procedures f 20~j
.
The Cost Accounting Standards Board (CAS3) was created
to deal with problems of cost accounting for significant
negotiated defense contracts. The CAS3 was intended to
help the federal government and its suppliers of products
and services agree on what is meant by "cost". Because
prices are often negotiated on the basis of estimated costs,
the Congress directed the Board to issue standards covering
cost estimates for contract negotiation and for cost
ascertainment during and after contract performance for
the administration and settlement of contracts f9l-
Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover was one of the early leaders
of the movement which led to the creation of the CASB. In
June 1968, the House of Representatives passed a bill
13

requiring the General Accounting Office (GAO) to develop
uniform cost accounting standards and to recommend them
to the Congress for enactment. An amendment to the bill,
proposed by Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, also an
early leader of the uniform cost accounting activity, pro-
vided that, instead of establishing standards, the GAO make
a study of the feasibility of establishing standards. The
compromise proposal was passed into law. The resulting GAO
study was significant, and the final report showed the
magnitude of the need. A growing proportion of purchases or
procurements by the Department of Defense had been contracted
for on a negotiated, rather than a formally advertised bid
basis. In the last five fiscal years prior to 1969 » an
average of 86 percent of DOD procurements by contract were
obtained through negotiation. Out of an average of approx-
imately $38 billion per year awarded for military procurements,
approximately $33 billion were committed through negotiated
contracts. In fiscal year 1969. 89 percent of military
procurement—over $36 billion--was obtained by contract
negotiation. In the same year, government-wide negotiated
procurement represented $46 billion out of a total of $53
billion, or more than 86 percent I l4j.
It was pointed out during Congressional debate that
uniform cost accounting standards were necessary mainly
because of substantially increased costs of procurements
and difficulties in contract administration. In a negotiated
bid situation, the estimate of the contractor's cost plays
14

an important role in the establishment of the price. The
cost accounting principles followed also have a large
impact on the determination of contractor costs. In the
absence of "uniform principles," evaluation of contractor
practices rests entirely upon procurement officials. Pro-
curement officials were forced to rely upon the concept of
"generally accepted accounting principles" as a guide to
ascertaining costs. Testimony was offered from professional
accountants to the effect that one of the weaknesses of
generally accepted accounting principles was that, although
the alternatives for treatment of costs in the accounts were
well known, the criteria for the use of each alternative
had never been established or "generally accepted" £l^]-
The General Accounting Office report generally concluded
that establishing and applying cost accounting standards
would not only be feasible but would also achieve a greater
degree of "conformity and consistency" in cost accounting
than existed at that time. The report further concluded
that detailed uniformity of practices was not a feasible
objective. One area of major concern was whether the cost
of implementing cost accounting standards could be justified
by the benefits derived. The Congress decided, however,
that a definite need for the standards existed. On August
15, 1970, President Nixon signed Public Law 91-379, an
amendment to the defense production act of 1950, which




The CASB has five members comprised of the Comptroller
General as chairman, one member each from industry and the
public sector, and two from the accounting profession, one
of which must have a background in small business firm
accounting problems. Membership on the Board is a part-time
activity; most Board members have other full-time jobs. The
Board does have a full-time executve secretary and a pro-
fessional staff of approximately 25- Over half of the staff
are CPA's, some have earned doctorates, and several are
attorneys j* 9 ]•
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE CASE
The primary objective of the CASB is to issue clearly
stated Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) which achieve the
following goals
:
(1) An increased degree of uniformity in cost accounting
practices among government contractors in like circumstances.
(2) Consistency in cost accounting practices in like
circumstances by individual government contractors over
periods of time.
In accomplishing this primary objective, the Board takes
into account the probable costs of implementation, including
inflationary effects, if any, compared to the probable benefits
of such standards. A CAS is a statement formally issued by
the Board that (1) enunciates a principle or principles to
be followed, (2) establishes practices to be applied, and/
or (3) specifies criteria to be employed in selecting from
alternative principles and practices in estimating,
16

accumulating, and reporting costs of contracts. A standard
may be stated in terms as general or as specific as
necessary to accomplish its purpose [ 15 J«
C. RESEARCH TECHNIQUES
The CASB has directed that its activities he conducted
openly. Accordingly, the staff had to develop relations
with government agencies, the accounting profession, and
defense contractors. An important part of the staff
activity was the encouragement of the accounting profession
to assist the Board. Techniques for cooperative staff work
were developed and proved to be quite useful.
A summarization of the process which the CASB has approved
for staff development of proposed cost accounting standards
is appropriate since the same general methodology will be
used here in the consideration of a possible standard on
capacity-related costs. The first step is the identification
of a problem area. No significant staff effort is devoted
to a particular topic unless the board approves that topic
for further activity. Once a potential problem area has
been identified, the staff engages in extensive research
to determine the severity of the problem and to inquire
into the likely usefulness of a cost accounting standard.
Authoritative literature is examined, and consultation with
knowledgeable representatives of contractors, government
agencies, and professional associations is conducted. This
research provides background on all relevant viewpoints.
17

Further investigation may vary, depending upon the situation;
but every effort to obtain as much outside participation
as is practicable is made at every step of the process.
The Board has demonstrated a willingness to revise pro-
posed standards in response to outside criticism.
Constructive criticisms which offer alternatives to proposed
Board actions are welcomed.
The analysis of the problem may help to determine
whether there is, in fact, a need for a cost accounting
standard and may lead to the development of a number of
possible solutions. The most promising potential solutions
may be tested in practical situations at contractor
locations. Sometimes identified deficiencies can be
corrected by modifying existing audit practices or, per-
haps, better information can be made available to the
contracting parties.
If the staff research, including reactions to a draft
standard, shows that a cost accounting standard is appro-
priate, a specific exposure draft is developed for
publication in the Federal Register . This exposure draft
begins the official promulgation procedure. One of the
strengths of the CASB procedures is that the government
position is not rigidly established prior to the proposal
being released to the public. The final versions of
Board promulgations may contain many changes from the
preliminary exposure drafts f" 9 7*
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D. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CASE
To date, the Cost Accounting Standards Board has
promulgated standards dealing with a broad range of topics
from consistency in reporting requirements to the allocation
of various types of costs to final cost objectives. In
addition, there are several proposed standards on indirect
costs. Understandably, the Board's work has elicited a
variety of reactions, both laudatory and critical.
Criticism of the work of the CASB was levied by the
Aerospace Industry Association (AIA) in mid-1977 when it
released the results of a survey among its members on the
economic impact of cost accounting standards. The survey
concluded that the savings forecast from establishment of
the CASB have failed to materialize. The study cited new
delays and difficulties in contracting and reduced com-
petition for government contracts and subcontracts. The
surveys also criticized the CASB for creating considerable
contract administration effort without compensating
benefits to the government [ll^.
CASB Chairman, Elmer B. Staats, defended the Board's
record by pointing to the effective standards and inter-
pretations issued at that time. Staats said that some
critics of the Board, mostly in Congress, have admonished
the Board for moving too slowly while others, particularly
from industry, have criticized it for moving too quickly [ll~\
Another critic of the Board, Robert F. Trimble,
assistant administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement
19

Policy, suggested that Congress overreached when it created
the CASB and that it would have been better for the govern-
ment to
stop at disclosure and consistency requirements and
improve its own internal analysis capabilities than to
impose the standards we have today on private sector
firms that are overregulated £ll
,
p. 321.
Administration of cost accounting standards was cited
as a major problem by the well-respected Logistics Mange-
ment Institute (LMI) in a report of January 1979-
Administration covers the actions contractors must take
to comply with standards, rules, and regulations of the
CASB as implemented in Defense Acquisition Regulations
(DAR) and also the actions DOD Administrative Contracting
Officers (ACO's) must take to ensure contractors' compliance
with CAS requirements.
The LMI findings indicated that the major problem in
the administration of CAS ' s is the difficulty many ACO's
experience in executing CAS requirements. Most prevalent
difficulties include determining the adequacy of compliance
with present and proposed cost accounting practices, the
impact of changes on costs, and the significance and
materiality of reported noncompliance. As a group, ACO's
are inadequately prepared to make the required decisions
and rely instead on the advice of DCAA auditors. The
average ACO lacks the formal accounting education needed
to understand the cost accounting theory and practice
20

embodied in the standards and has not received adequate
training and guidance f 19l-
21

III. CAPACITY -RELATED COSTS
One of the major problems in dealing with the subject
of capacity and capacity-related costs is the absence of
specific definitions and clearly understood concepts. A
review of the current literature, however, reveals certain
recurring and accepted concepts, the most pertinent of which
will be examined. The discussion here will include two
alternatives for the disposition of idle capacity costs.
In addition, basic, to an understanding of capacity-related
costs is a review of the much discussed, although never
resolved, controversy over variable (direct) versus
absorption costing. Specific attention will be given to
William J. Vatter's research report of 19^9, which was
prepared specifically for use in the GAO ' s feasibility
study for adopting uniform cost accounting standards f 1^,
p. ^81-558 J . Finally, the only existing rules concerning
capacity-related costs, which are contained in Section XV
of the Defense Acquisition Regulations, will be summarized.
A. TERMINOLOGY
Capacity . No simple practical defintion for capacity
exists. Capacity constitutes that fixed amount of plant
and machinery and of personnel to which management has
committed itself and with which it expects to do




It is not merely a matter of plant size. Capacity may be
expanded by construction of new plant facilities or by
purchase of new equipment. . . Capacity may also be
expanded in the short run by working additional shifts,
by working overtime and on weekends, and by contracting
with other companies to produce some of the necessary
output. . . Thus capacity is established by managerial
decisions as well as by physical plant limitations.
However, it is defined, capacity places an upper limit
on output f*3» p. 173 J*
Capacity, therefore, contains two separate concepts: (1)
the physical and human elements that constitute capacity
and (2) its function as an upper limit or constraint on
output.
Volume . Volume denotes business activity of some kind
and is generally expressed in units of production F 3 7-
Volume is the variable factor in business or production.
It is related to capacity in that volume or activity repre-
sents the level of utilization of existing capacity.
The distinction between capacity and volume is important
because the literature revealed that a co-mingling of
concepts was present during definitions of the various levels
of capacity. These certain levels of capacity include the
following:
Theoretical Capacity . Theoretical capacity is the
maximum output of which facilities and personnel are
physically capable under ideal operating conditions with
no interruptions £.10 J-
Practical Capacity . Practical capacity represents the
maximum level of output that could be achieved by facilities
and personnel with allowances made for unavoidable inter-
ruptions such as time lost for repairs and maintenance,
23

inefficiencies, set-up failures, delays in deliveries of
raw materials and labor shortages and absences. These
allowances reduce theoretical capacity to the practical
capacity level. The reduction typically ranges from 15
percent to 25 percent resulting in a practical capacity
level of 75 to 85 percent of theoretical capacity [loj.
The source for the above described levels of capacity,
Matz and Usry, along with several other authors also
define terms such as "expected actual capacity" and "normal
capacity." These terms only serve to complicate a dis-
cussion of capacity-related costs because what they really
represent are volume concepts. They deal with planned
levels of production or production averaged over several
business cycles to eliminate peaks and valleys. Normal
volume is an extremely important concept to cost accounting
since that is the level at which overhead rates will be
computed. The use of the computed rate will cause all
overhead to be absorbed, provided normal volume and estimated
expenses prevail during the period. "Expected actual volume '
is a common alternative to 'normal volume" for computing
overhead rates
.
Idle Capacity versus Excess Capacity . Idle capacity
results from the temporary idleness of production facilities
due to a slow-down or shut-down in production caused by a
temporary lack of orders. Idle facilities are restored to
use as soon as the need or demand arises. Expenses
associated with idle capacity are part of the product cost.
2^

Excess capacity, on the other hand, results from greater
productive capacity than the company can reasonably expect
to use. Expenses arising from excess capacity should be
excluded from the factory overhead rate and from the product
cost [lO"]. The cause and the duration of the idleness
are the characteristics that distinguish idle from excess
capacity. Idle capacity is caused by external happenings
and should last for only a short period of time. Excess
capacity connotes an indefinite or long term duration; it
could also be the result of some deliberate internal manage-
ment action such as the acquisition of plant and equipment
for long-range expansion. The use of the term "idle
facilities" in conjunction with the definition of idle
capacity is unfortunate because, as discussed later in
this chapter, "idle facilities " will take on a specific
meaning of its own when used in Defense Acquisition
Regulations (DAR) . It will then be equated with excess
capacity.
Variable Costs .
Variable costs are those costs which vary in total in
direct proportion to change- in volume. Successive
increases of volume result in parallel and proportionate
increases in variable costs. Similarly, decreases in
volume produce proportionate cost decreases M» p> 22 J.
Fixed Costs . "Fixed costs remain constant in total
regardless of changes in volume. They are unaffected by
volume changes" ("3, p. 23I •
Absorption Costing . A type of cost accounting
practice that assigns direct materials and direct labor
25

costs and a share of both fixed and variable factory
overhead costs to units of production is referred to as
absorption costing. This practice is also known as "full"
or conventional costing.
Variable (or Direct) Costing . A cost accounting practice
which charges units of production with only those costs that
vary directly with volume is variable costing. Costs such
as depreciation, insurance, and taxes that are a function
of time are excluded from the cost of the product £lOJ.
Full Costing . The determination of full cost, as the
term is used for government contracting purposes, appears
to have evolved from the usual product cost determination.
After direct material, direct labor and production overhead
costs have been allocated to the product or other "final
cost objectives" in the usual fashionwithin the broad frame-
work of generally accepted accounting principles, an
additional cost allocation is performed to allocate all
relevant period costs to these same cost objectives. Thus,
all allowable costs incurred by the business entity are
allocated through the cost accounting system. The alloca-
tion base used to allocate those period costs, frequently
referred to as "general and administrative costs," tends to
be some broad base such as the total of production costs £ ll .
B. AN ALTERNATE BASS FOR ALLOCATING CAPACITY COSTS
An important feature of the allocation process described
under full costing is that it ignores the distinction between
fixed and variable costs. Consequently, any change in the
26

volume of production can dramatically affect unit costs.
If output drops, fixed costs have to be spread over a smaller
volume and unit costs will increase, possibly by a substantial
amount. While this situation applies to any cost system
that allocates fixed costs to products, the impact of such
an allocation process is felt more acutely under the full
cost concept. Even if a breakdown between fixed and variable
costs is recognized but the fixed costs are nevertheless
traced to the product as part of the full cost and therefore
part of the price to the government, the problem of allo-
cating fixed costs to products remains. Product costs and
prices may be affected to a substantial degree by changes
in volume f 1 1.
There is an alternative to allocation under the full
cost concept that is available under certain conditions.
This alternative is based on the notion that a business
entity's fixed costs represent capacity costs. The
traditional method of full costing ensures that capacity
costs are allocated to final cost objectives, generally on
some basis related to actual production. However, the
rationale behind the selection of such an allocation base
can be challenged. Capacity, it may be argued, is created
in anticipation of a certain volume of production; and,
therefore, it may be appropriate to allocate capacity
costs on the basis of expected or anticipated utilization
rather than on the basis of actual production volume. There
is an important qualification to the application of this
27

principle however; capacity can be allocated on this basis
only if the potential customers can be clearly identified
and some type of long term relationship can be established.
Once this qualifying requirement is satisfied, it seems
quite feasible to allocate the fixed capacity costs on the
basis of anticipated volume and to use conventional oost
accounting principles to allocate the remaining variable
costs [l] .
The principle of separate allocation of capacity costs
on the basis of expected capacity utilization could be
applied where a more or less permanent relationship is
established between the buyer and the seller. For example,
in certain areas of defense procurement a significant number
of major defense contractors have established what appear
to be long-term relationships with various procurement
agencies. However, a basically radical experiment of this
nature may be difficult to implement in the essentially
conservative accounting environment that appears to prevail
in the government contract costing area^lj.
C. IDLE CAPACITY COSTS: TWO ALTERNATIVES
When a decision is made to incur costs of land, building,
equipment and other physical attributes of capacity, that
decision is made with a capacity goal in mind. The capacity
goal is simply an expectation of production. In this con-
text, some goals are reached and some are approached or
exceeded; but they all imply an expected standard of output.
At the beginning of production, such a standard may be used
28

to determine idle capacity, that portion of capacity not
contributing to output. This will be an unreliable measure
initially because what is expected of a facility is not
necessarily what the facility is capable of producing. After
some time and experience and through a continuing and
dynamic process, a standard or normal output can be established,
A deviation from this on the low side is one measure of idle
capacity £ Z\
1. The Argument for Charging; Idle Capacity Costs to
Products
The net income of an enterprise over its lifetime is
equal to total revenues less total expenditures. When re-
sources are expended, they are categorized as expenses, assets,
or losses. Expenses are incurred when money is spent for
legitimate business purposes but nothing of measurable value
is left behind that was not there before. Assets, on the
other hand, involve the same kind of expenditure of resources;
but they result in additions to business wealth in the form
of inventories, facilities, or other items of value. Losses
are expenditures of funds which result in no benefit, either
in services or assets. If the long-range view of a business
enterprise (the "going concern" concept) is accepted and an
accounting view of business success (maximizing owners'
equity) is also maintained, then the measure of success does
not depend on any categorization of expenditures but only
on the amount by which revenues exceed expenditures during
the existence of the enterprise.
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If the concept of matching revenues and expenditures
is also accepted and because products of the firm are the
only source of revenues,- then all expenditures during the
life of a firm (whether categorized temporarily as expenses,
assets, or losses) are actually product costs. In the long
term, all costs must be shared by all products; but, in the
short term, the question arises as to which costs belong
to which products. For example, if a plant manufactures
certain products this year and anticipates manufacturing
more next year, what would be a fair way to allocate the
firm's advertising expenses to products? Certainly both
this year's and next year's outputs derive benefit from the
advertisingo What is needed is a system whereby this year's
production could be assigned a proper share of the cost as
the products were completed. The remaining costs could
reside in an asset account and be amortized to transfer
such costs to future products \_2 J.
Capacity costs are customarily distributed to products
On the basis of some logical method of allocation. However,
a problem of idle capacity arises when a facility or machine
is idle some portion of the time. It still incurs costs at
a constant rate (based on time) , regardless of its lack of
output. Whatever products are produced will yield the only
revenues against which all the fixed costs must be matched.
All of the costs of all the capacity can be absorbed only
by all of the products which those costs produced, regardless
of the number of products that come off the production line.
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The establishment of capacity in any form is a long
range decision. There must be enough capacity to take
advantage of surges in demand and to accommodate a firm's
expected growth pattern. Some idle capacity, therefore,
has to be accepted. Everyone in business recognizes
seasonal fluctuations, business cycles and rapid changes in
demand. Fluctuations in capacity use do occur, and the
costs are ultimately a part of aggregate product costs.
In the short run, a firm must recover all variable costs
through sale of its products; any excess will contribute
to the absorption of fixed costs and to profit. But, in
the long run, all costs, including those generated by idle
capacity, must be recovered or the firm will cease to
exist f 2 1.
2. The Argument for Charging Idle Capacity Costs to
Current Expense
Eric Kohler defines idle capacity as
unused productive potential: said of a machine, operation
or plant not in use or only partially in use; it may be
variously measured, as in tons of possible additional
output, or in hours available for use [3, p. 223 J.
Idle capacity is that capacity which is not used productively
at a specific time. The costs of the existence and maint-
enance of that unused capacity are the costs of idle capacity.
If specific points in time are expanded into a period of
time, the idle capacity costs are averaged because at every
point in time there will likely be a different amount of




The cost of a product is dependent on the materials,
labor, use of equipment and floor space necessary for pro-
duction. If some other part of a plant were idle, there
seems to be little logic in assigning any of the costs of
that portion of the plant to products manufactured in the
active part of the plant. Costs of idle capacity are nor-
mally higher at a time when products are difficult to sell,
and prices may be lower. Since inventory cannot have a
value greater than selling price, it may be impossible to
assign idle capacity costs to products. The proper dis-
tribution of these excess production costs is to profit and
loss. The argument here is that, while other costs are
considered controllable, idle capacity costs are not
controllable at the manufacturing plant level. Idle capacity
costs are generally the responsibility of some part of the
organization other than production. It may be sales,
marketing or top management; but such costs are almost
never the fault of the producing part of the company. These
costs are not product oriented and should not be accounted
for as product costs [2 J.
D. VARIABLE (DIRECT) VERSUS ABSORPTION COSTING TECHNIQUES
The question of whether fixed costs of production should
be product costs or charged as an expense of the period in
which incurred has been a controversial issue in recent
years. Several agencies of the federal government with
authority in accounting matters have taken action which
lends considerable support to the "full absorption" method of
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accounting for costs Tl2j. Full absorption costing is the
practice of fully charging cost objectives with a proportion-
ate share of all costs. Technically, the full absorption
model describes the practice of allocating all costs of
production to inventories; however, the phrase is broadening
to include the allocation of all costs of all functions,
including general and administrative, to cost objectives as
well.
Variable (direct) costing, on the other hand, embodies
the theory that fixed costs of production are costs of the
period in which incurred and, as such, should be recognized
as expenses during the current period. Since no direct
casual or beneficial relationship can be identified between
fixed costs of a period and specific cost objectives of that
period, fixed costs are viewed as costs of the period in
which incurred.
To date, the strongest support for the full absorption
method of accounting has come from the Cost Accounting
Standards Board. The GAS3 rationale, in short, states that
the full absorption method results in the proper measure
of cost for pricing purposes under cost reimbursement or
cost-based contracts. The seller attempts to recover a
proportionate share of all his costs, and the buyer seeks
to satisfy himself that he is paying no more than an equit-
able portion of costs allocable to his work Tl2l.
In the controversy between variable (direct) and full
costing, the most fundamental point is the question of
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whether fixed manufacturing costs are costs of the product
produced or whether they are costs of the period in which
they were incurred. Traditionally, accounting reports have
treated them as product costs. Variable (direct) costing
would treat them wholly as period costs j^-J-
The concept of a period cost was well explained by
Charles T. Horngren and George H. Sorter:
Proponents of variable costing maintain that fixed factory
overhead provides capacity to produce. Whether that
capacity is used to the fullest extent or not used at
all is usually irrelevant insofar as the expiration of
fixed costs is concerned... As the clock ticks, fixed
costs expire, to be replenished by new bundles of fixed
costs that will enable production to continue in succeeding
periods £7, p. 887.
The period cost concept, in essence, states that there
are certain costs which, by their nature, expire with the
passage of time, regardless of production activity. They
are incurred for the benefit of operations during a given
period of time. The benefit is unchanged by activity levels
during the period and, in any event, it expires at the end
of the period £^J. The period cost concept clearly con-
flicts with the traditional accounting view that costs
attach to production and that time periods are established
arbitrarily as a convenience in matching costs with
revenues.
Proponents of the product cost concept argue that all
manufacturing costs are. costs of the product and there is
no such thing as a manufacturing cost of the period.
Logically, all so-called fixed production costs should be
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amortized by a unit-of-output method, which would attach
costs to the units those costs were intended to produce,
rather than by a method based on time, which is an arbitrary
measure of production. Time period amortization is accept-
able only as a practical convenience, the need for which
derives from uncertainty as to future operations. James M.
Fremgen, in supporting the product cost concept, contended
that
... in theory there is no such thing as a true period
cost. All costs incurred by a firm, including non-
manufacturing costs, are costs of the product. For the
product of a firm is not merely a physical commodity
from a production line; it is a bundle of economic
utilities which include time and place as well as form.
Thus, in theory, distribution and administrative costs
are just as much costs of the product as are factory
costs. The product is not complete until it is in a
form and place at a time desired by the customer; and
this product completion involves distribution just as
essentially as it does manufacturing £5> P- 78J.
An enterprise is not interested in capacity, as such,
but in production and the consequent revenue. Capacity
is merely a means to production and should be regarded as
part of the cost thereof in the same way as materials and
labor. According to the product cost approach, fixed
costs are assigned to the product rather than the period
because the product generates the revenue. The time period
is purely incidental to the operations of the firm {J±J>
E. AN EXAMINATION OF WILLIAM J. VATTER'S RESEARCH REPORT
In August of 1969. William J. Vatter of the University
of California (Berkeley) prepared a research report for the
Comptroller General of the United States, entitled Standards
35

for Cost Analysis , in which he tried to establish a basis
for uniformity in the basic standards for cost determination.
Vatter's report was included as an appendix to the Comptroller
General's feasibility study which ultimately led to the
creation of the CASB.
Vatter maintained that fixed costs should not be mixed
in with other kinds of costs when making cost assignments.
Fixed costs should remain unassigned to any cost objectives
unless it is a direct cost assignable to a single cost
objective. He reasoned that this position was a logical
consequence of the fact that fixed costs are typically irrele-
vant to short run decisions; relevant costs are those which
will be affected by the decision. In all situations that
do not require change in available capacity, fixed costs
are unchanged by the situation and are thus irrelevant £l^J-
There is an increasing acceptance of the procedures
whereby fixed costs are not allocated to product output and
inventories. This "direct costing" approach is philosophically
opposed to the conventional notion of full absorption cost-
ing, in which all costs, including fixed costs, are traced
to final cost objectives. Direct costing, according to
Vatter, would best be described as "variable" costing because
the variable costs will include elements that are not con-
ventionally considered to be direct costs, such as fringe
labor costs, overtime premiums, power, and supplies. Variable
costing treats all variable costs as assignable to cost
objectives but regards fixed costs as outlays or amortizations
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related to providing the capacity to produce for a time
period. Capacity costs or period costs, as they are often
referred to by advocates of "direct" costing, are left
unassigned to products on the premise that capacity costs
cannot be saved by any ordinarily feasible decision or
adjustment. The only situation in which allocated fixed
costs are relevant to managerial action is one in which
legal or contractual obligations require such allocations
as part of negotiated arrangements (^l^J.
Even though the fixed costs of providing capacity are
not relevant to managerial decisions, the facilities
provided are available for any use they may serve. Any
amount that may be gained from using them in a particular
way is an opportunity cost of using them in some other way.
If a machine can produce a contribution margin of five
dollars for each hour of use on one product, it would not
be advantageous to shift to another product unless a net
contribution of at least five dollars for each hour can be
attained. This, of course, depends upon the amount of
total business that is available. When a plant is operating
at less than full potential, any business that will bring
in any more than the amount of variable cost incurred should
be accepted. Management will seek the most advantageous
sales up to its comfortable capacity level.
During contract negotiation, management will have in
mind the alternative uses of the facilities to be used for
that contract. Thus, any negotiated price will be at least
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enough to cover the opportunity cost of the facilities to
be used. This opportunity cost may be as much as the
highest alternative net contribution margin per unit of
capacity with the plant operating at "comfortable" (practical)
capacity [l^J.
If fixed costs are allocated to cost objectives, they
must not be mixed with other kinds of costs; they must be
identified with homogeneous cost pools; and the allocations
must be based on practical (normal) capacity. This would,
be necessity, be less than maximum capacity to allow for
down time, for maintenance and repairs, and for a small
cushion for random fluctuations and emergencies.
The cost of providing capacity which is not used--because
there is no desirable employment for it--is a cost of not
producing. It should not be charged against any other
activities or products. Separating the costs of unused
facilities from the costs that may be assigned to cost
objectives presents a difficult problem--that of defining
capacity. What amount of facilities or services represents
normal use? Equipment may be used in overtime periods if
necessary; it may be put on a two or three shift basis and
used seven days a week if a need exists. This will probably
result in an increase in the fixed costs over that of a
normal one-shift range, but it will also tend to spread or
dilute those fixed costs which do not increase when the
range of activity is broadened, such as the obsolescence
element of depreciation. The combination of effects is merely
an extension of the basic problem of keeping variable and
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and fixed costs separate. If fixed costs must be allocated,
they should never exceed the opportunity cost at practical (normal)
capacity £l^J-
Vatter attacked the "fair and equitable" assignment of
fixed costs to cost objectives, which many consider to be
essential, as a mixing of issues. Cost measurement must
be based upon objective evidence, logically and consistently
analyzed and interpreted. No cost assignment should be made
without a valid (statistically verifiable) justification.
Fairness and equity are conditions that arise from nego-
tiation, from ethical and motivational considerations. The
purpose of cost measurement is to supplement personal judge-
ments by measuring and determining the financial effects of
activities. Rather than to cloud the measurement and logic
of cost assignments with equitable considerations, Yatter
contended that it is better to leave some cost items
unassigned and subject to negotiation, if they cannot be
assigned with statistical confidence. There is certainly
no justification for sweeping any costs under a rug of
capricious assignment merely because they should be assigned
fairly. Negotiation should take over when measurement is
impossible £l^3.
F. DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATIONS --SECTION XV: CONTRACT
COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES
The Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) are issued by
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Logistics) on a continuing basis. Section XV of the DAR
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contains general cost principles and procedures for the
pricing of contracts whenever cost analysis is performed,
for contract modifications, and for the determination,
negotiation, or allowance of costs, when such action is
required by a contract clause. Principles and procedures
pertaining to capacity are quoted below. These definitions
and concepts are necessary because of their importance to
the discussion of the CASE issues paper in Chapter IV and
the desirability analysis in Chapter V.
Composition of Total Cost .
The total cost of a contract is the sum of the
allowable direct and indirect costs allocable to the
contract, incurred or to be incurred less any allocable
credits. In ascertaining what constitutes cost, any
generally accepted method of determining or estimating
costs that is equitable under the circumstances may be
used, including the use of standard costs properly
adjusted for applicable variances £l6 , p. 15 ! 7J«
Reasonable Cost .
A cost is reasonable if, in its nature of amount,
it does not exceed that which would be incurred by an
ordinarily prudent person in the conduct of competitive
business fl6, p. 15 : 7j.
Direct Costs .
A direct cost is any cost which can be identified
specifically with a particular final cost objective.
No final cost objective shall have allocated to it as a
direct cost, any cost, if other costs incurred for the
same purpose, in like circumstances, have been included
in any indirect cost pool to be allocated to that or any
other final cost objectives f*l6 , p. 15'9]-
Indirect Costs .
An indirect cost is one which, because of its
incurrence for common or joint objectives, is not readily
subject to treatment as a direct cost. . . After direct
costs have been determined and charged directly to the
contract or other work as appropriate, indirect costs are
^0

those remaining to be allocated to the several cost
objectives £16, p. 15 : 9_J^
Facilities .
Facilities means plant or any portion thereof
(inclusive of land integral to the operation); equipment
individually or collectively; or any other tangible capi-
tal asset, wherever located, and whether owned or leased
by the contractor £l6, p. 15:25j-
Idle Facilities . "Idle facilities means completely
unused facilities that are excess to the contractor's
current needs." Ql6, p. 15=25]
Idle Capacity .
Idle capacity means the unused capacity of partially
used facilities. It is the difference between that
which a facility could achieve under 100 percent operating
time on a one-shift basis less operating interruptions
resulting from time lost for repairs, setups; unsatis-
factory materials, and other normal delays, and the extent
to which the facility was actually used to meet demands
during the accounting period flo, p. 15:25j.
Costs of Idle Facilities or Idle Capacity .
Costs of idle facilities or idle capacity are costs such
as maintenance, repair, housing, rent, and otherrelated
costs, e.g., property taxes, insurance and depreciation.
The Costs of idle facilities are unallowable except to
the extent that (l) they are necessary to meet fluctuations
in workload; or (2) although not necessary to meet fluctu-
ations in workload, they were necessary when acquired and
are now idle because of changes in program requirements,
contractor efforts to produce more economically, reorgani-
zation, termination, or other causes which, could not have
been reasonable foreseen £l6
, p. 15:25j.
The costs of idle capacity are normal costs of
doing business and are a factor in the normal fluctuations
of usage or overhead rates from period to period. Such
costs are allowable, provided the capacity is reasonably
DAR's definition of "idle capacity" is the same as that
previously developed; however, the previously discussed
"excess capacity" equates to DAR's "idle facilities."
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anticipated to be necessary or was originally reasonable
and is not subject to reduction or elimination by sub-
letting, renting, or sale, in accordance with sound
business, economics, or security practices. Widespread
idle capacity throughout an entire plant or among a
group of assets having substantially the same function
may be idle facilities £l6, p. 15:25T
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IV. PRESENTATION OF RESPONSES TO THE CAS3 ISSUES PAPER
A. CASB ISSUES PAPER ON CAPACITY -RELATED COSTS
Appendix A contains the actual text of the CASB issues
paper on capacity-related costs. The paper requests
responses to seven different broad issues and provides
respondents with the opportunity to bring up other points
that should be considered by the study. The paper does
not request a response as to the respondents' opinions of
whether or not there is a legitimate requirements for a
CAS in this area; however, that is the first issue addressed
in a majority of the responses. Accordingly, that issue
will be analyzed first, followed by the eight issues listed
in the paper. Each major issue, including its subsidiary
questions, is presented as a separate section of this chapter.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the staff research
for a proposed CAS, as described in Chapter II, is the
examination of all relevant viewpoints on the issue. In
keeping with that procedure, the responses to the issues
paper will be analyzed. Forty-three usable responses were
received by the CASB--five from the academic community,
five from different accounting associations, ten from
various government agencies, and twenty-three from con-
tractors in a variety of industries. All are in the form
of letters to the CASB and will be identified occasionally
by name; more often, however, identification will be by
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the previously mentioned groupings. Often a particularly
well-worded or pertinent response will be used to represent
a consensus of opinion or a dissenting opinion on some
issue.
Several issues elicited numerous and lengthy responses,
while others received little attention. The analysis of
the responses must, by necessity, be somewhat subjective
because the data are of a type not subject to statistical
analysis. An attempt was made to allow equal weight to each
of the responses; however, this was not possible in all
cases. Some of the responses did not address the issues
specifically and others addressed some points but excluded
others from consideration. Those respondents who addressed
all of the primary and subsidiary issues, in effect, caused
their opinions to be weighted more than those not offering
complete responses. There seemed to be a positive
correlation between the extensiveness of the response and
the degree to which the respondent was involved in negoti-
ated, government contracts, although the correlation
certainly could not be quantified.
B. IS THERE A LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENT FOR A COST ACCOUNTING
STANDARD ON CAPACITY-RELATED COSTS?
Although not a specific issue to be addressed, many
respondents made their attitudes toward the need for a CAS
in the area of capacity-related costs quite clear by their
prefatory or introductory remarks. Others simply offered
advice or words of warning.
M

Dr. Robert Anthony of Harvard University suggested that
the sole problem for the study was to distinguish between
idle capacity costs that are properly charged to a con-
tract and those that are not. He does not believe that a
distinction between "committed costs" and "managed costs,"
between fixed and variable costs, or between direct and
indirect costs is relevant to the problem. The Committee
on Cost Accounting Standards of the American Accounting
Association feared that significant measurement difficulties
might occur in attempting to develop a rule based on the
concept of capacity. The measurement question arose in a
majority of the responses as one particular problem area.
The Association of Government Accountants emphatically
expressed the desire that "whatever criteria are developed
concerning these (capacity) costs must make perfectly clear
the firmly established applicability of full absorption
costing.
"
The Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations
(CODSIA) expressed apprehension that a standard on capacity-
related costs would generate much greater administrative
costs for both the government and the contractor and would
foster many disputes concerning the determination of
capacity for each contractor facility. A serious concern
was also expressed over the nation's industrial base being
capable of major production increases should the country's
welfare require them. The CASB was asked not to encourage
a reduction of present and possible future capacity through
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a cost accounting standard, while other agencies of the
government are properly planning for the use of such
capacity.
Of the ten responses received from governmental agencies,
three indicated a favorable attitude toward developing the
standard, two were definitely opposed, and the remaining
five indicated ambivalence. The two respondents in
opposition were the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) . DOD indicated that it
would be a serious mistake to prescribe standards relating
to capacity-related costs which would require companies to
change existing practices that were originally designed to
meet their individual needs. In addition, DOD indicated no
awareness of any significant problems relating to capacity-
related costs of DOD contractors; therefore, issuance of
standards in this area would be counterproductive, resulting
in the incurrence of additional administrative expense and
quite likely generating problems and disputes where none
currently exist. DCAA was concerned with the ultimate
scope and the cost/benefit aspects of the contemplated
standard. Since capacity-related costs would seem to require
a cost accounting system that incorporates the features of a
flexible budget, at least a partial abandonment of the full
absorption approach to contract costing would be necessary.
Another likely requirement would be an additional type of
CAS contract price adjustment based on changes in the
contractor's use of capacity.
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Responses containing a favorable attitude were received
from the Interstate Commerce Commission and the National
Science Foundation, both of which believed that it was both
desirable and feasible to refine or further develop defin-
itions for procurement and accounting concepts involving the
measurement of capacity and utilization rates, Also, the
Renegotiation Board believed that the resolution of the
capacity-related costs issues would be beneficial to every-
one concerned.
Of the 23 responses received from contractors, 22
indicated clear and emphatic opposition to the development
of a standard on accounting for capacity-related costs.
Although numerous reasons were cited for this opposition,
several key points were of a recurring nature and are
significant enough to warrant listing as a consensus
opinion:
(1) The lack of objective criteria to be used for
"defining capacity and capacity-related costs prevent the
possibility that a standard could be written which would
have applicability to the wide spectrum of defense
contractors.
(2) A standard to cover the topic of capacity-related
costs is unnecessary. Defense Acquisition Regulations
(DAR) , Section 15-205-12, provide adequate workable
definitions to cover varying situations.
(3) The accounting for capacity-related costs is a
management concept, not a cost accounting concept, and,
^7

by its nature, is not compatible with the full absorption
concept required of government contractors.
(4) The most prevalent objection encountered was that
a standard in this area would cause the accounting pro-
cedures to become unduly complex and would result in
administrative costs far in excess of any benefits. In
fact, most contractors failed to see any benefit to either
the government or themselves.
Several responses, most notably those from major aircraft
manufacturing companies, were so adamant in their opposition
that the respones may be classified as hostile. One major
aircraft company opined:
The prospects of a cost accounting standard which
necessitates regular and recurring accounting and pricing
for a separate category of costs identified as capacity-
related costs has the attributes of an exercise in futility.
The inherent problems make it quite obvious that
this research project of the CASE is destined to fall well
beyond the point of diminishing return on any rational
cost/benefit scale.
Any election to continue to pursue this highly
theoretical concept for potential practical application
in government contracting has to be classified as a pure
luxury expenditure of taxpayer monies by the Board. .
.
Can we next expect to separately classify and account
for day and night cost, for normal and abnormal costs,
for fixed, semi-fixed, semi-variable and variable costs?
All would be conceivably possible, but who really wants
or needs such costly subtlety in classif icatiore of cost
for government contracting.
The same firm estimated that the costs incurred by the
several segments contributing to the response to the issues
paper clearly exceeded $5,000. These remarks were selected
for presentation not as representative of the entire group
of responses, but as the extreme in critical content.
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The single favorable response from a contractor
indicated that the development and issuance of guidelines
regarding the nature and behavior of capacity-related costs
may prove useful to both contracting officers and contractors
in consistently and fairly evaluating and resolving reim-
bursement issues.
C. WHAT IS THE CONCEPTUAL NATURE OF CAPACITY?
Does the concept of capacity apply only to
manufacturing facilities? Under what circumstances does
it apply to a research laboratory? To a warehouse? To
service industries?
Does the concept of physical capacity of a facility
differ from the concept of productive capacity of humans?
If so, how? (Appendix A)
A wide range of definitions was provided by the
respondents on the issue of the conceptual nature of
capacity. Dominating the spectrum of ideas were two basic
concepts? (1) capacity as a collection of plant, equipment
and personnel and (2) capacity as an upper limit or con-
straint on production. In most responses capacity was
believed to be measured in terms of output; however, in
some cases, capacity measurement in terms of input or size
was considered acceptable. Many attempts to define various
levels of capacity were made. Included were definitions
for theoretical, maximum, normal, probable, anticipated,
expected, and actual attained capacity. Although many of
the terms are different, the concepts are remarkably
similar. At the risk of oversimplifying, there are really




(1) Maximum (or theoretical) capacity is the absolute
greatest amount of output that can be achieved with a
fixed amount of resources (i.e., plant, equipment, personnel,
materials) being utilized at optimum efficiency. According
to the responses, there is a slight variation, in concept
only, as to how down-time for repairs and maintenance should
be considered. Some respondents included an allowance for
essential maintenance while others did not. The difference
is probably immaterial since both concepts represent a
theoretical level of output, one that could possibly be
achieved but not over an economically meaningful period.
(2) Practical (or normal) capacity is the level of
output that can be maintained over a long period of time,
taking into consideration such factors as occasional
breakdown, malfunction, repair time, and preventive maint-
enance. In the case of sequential manufacturing processes,
practical capacity also takes into account any bottlenecks.
The general opinion of the respondents is that maximum or
theoretical capacity has little relevance to cost accounting.
Practical or normal capacity is the level from which excess
capacity and idle capacity may be determined. Capacity was
not considered to be a static or fixed level, since changes
in capacity could be effected in a very short time simply
through management action and the number of interacting
variables comprising output capability.
The subsidiary issues offered little controversy.
Almost all respondents concurred that the concept of
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capacity applied equally to manufacturing facilities,
research laboratories, warehouses, service industries
and all areas of activity. Most agreed that the concept
of physical capacity of a facility did not differ from
the productive capacity of humans. The only significant
difference was one of measurement. Humans are subject to
motivation, emotions, stresses, peer pressure, and labor
union agreements so that, in many circumstances, the
measurement of human output (or capacity) may be so impre-
cise as to be meaningless.
One noticeable problem encountered in analyzing the
responses to this issue, particularly those from the
academic community, was the inclusion of "volume" concepts
as capacity concepts. For example, expected capacity was
defined as the expected output for the forthcoming account-
ing period. Actually attained capacity was defined as that
output produced during the previous year. Both of these
are definitions of volume and not capacity. A similar
confusion was observed in the terminology section of
Chapter III, therefore, this response was not unexpected.
D. HOW SHOULD CAPACITY BE MEASURED?
With respect to physical facilities, what is the
appropriate level for identification of capacity? Under
what circumstances should it be the business unit?
Cost center? Assembly line? Is the capacity of each
physical resource relevant or should capacity only be
measured for groups of resources?
What business practices need to be specified (or
assumed) in defining capacity? (5-day week? multi-shift?
preventive maintenance policy? prevalence of overtime?)
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What circumstances determine the appropriate unit of
measure? (e.g. machine hours, units of output?) How
about unit of measure for capacity of human resources?
(Appendix A)
As with all issues dealing with measurement, there were
few responses in agreement on any particular point. In
answering what is the appropriate level for identification
of capacity, the responses ranged from "the smallest integral
unit capable of producing an end product or service" to
"the integrated corporate level". For those respondents
utilizing the terminology of the issues paper, approximately
equal numbers indicated a preference for the 'business unit"
and the "cost center" as the appropriate level of identifi-
cation. The most often mentioned idea was that it was
dependent solely on the individual circumstances. Each
industry or even each company within an industry is unique
and requires specific sets of criteria in order to measure
capacity accurately.
A similar situation existed concerning what business
practices needed to be assumed in defining capacity. The
typical response was that a five-day week, single-shift
operation with a standard maintenance schedule and some
predetermined allowance for non-productive time was the
appropriate base. However, most responses also included
a provision that an alternate base be used for those
industries or companies that utilize significantly differ-
ent practices such as a blast furnace operation or an oil
refinery which operates on seven-day weeks and Zk-hour
days. One obvious area of confusion appeared throughout
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the discussions on capacity measurement: the use of the
term "generally accepted business practices." This is
exactly the type of terminology that needs to be avoided
because it is so imprecise. One response which offered
perhaps a better description, although the actual deter-
mination problem would be just as great, was "business
practices that result in optimum lowest cost £perj unit of
production." The most practical suggestion was offered by
DCAA--a contractor's disclosure statement could be used to
describe the conditions assumed for levels of capacity.
The disclosure statement is required of major contractors
and requires a description of the cost accounting procedures
used by the company.
The appropriate unit of measure for capacity was
generally agreed to be the unit of output for a particular
process or firm; however, it was recognized that such a
measure only applies when the output is homogeneous (i.e.
tons of steel, barrels of oil). In the case of a multi-
product firm, some other common denominator must be
obtained. Direct labor hours, machine hours, or total
dollar value of production are potential capacity measures,
depending entirely on the individual operation considered.
The unit selected must be the one that is most represent-
ative of productive operations.
The measurement of capacity of human resources was
not considered by most respondents to be a meaningful
concept. The notion of man-hours or direct labor hours
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was considered to be a useful measure of human production
but only when applied to repetitive, routine functions,
such as assembly line work. Man-hours or labor hours were
not a significant measure for management functions, research
efforts, and other similar processes involving more complex
applications of human effort.
E. HOW ARE COSTS (DIRECT AND INDIRECT) LINKED TO CAPACITY?
Over what time span should capacity be considered
to be fixed?
How do you determine which specific costs are linked
to capacity?
.vhat happens if utilization differs from that which
was expected?
How can capacity-related costs be treated under a
full absorption concept? Under what circumstances should
idle plant costs be distributed to production? -<hat are
the alternatives? (Appendix A)
The meaning of this particular issue was not interpreted
in the same way by a majority of the respondents. Most
failed to offer any general comments and answered only the
subsidiary issues. Those who did respond to the general
issue indicated that costs were linked to capacity but that
a distinction between direct and indirect costs was not
relevant to the determination of capacity costs. The
relevant distinction was between fixed and variable costs,
although few contractors chose to use those terms. Instead,
most defined capacity costs as those encountered in pro-
viding and maintaining the physical facilities and providing
whatever additional resources (equipment, manpower, materials)
were necessary to operate a business entity. A significant
5^

number of contractors indicated that capacity costs were
those that did not vary with changes in production or
activity. This coincides precisely with the definition
of fixed costs previously discussed in Chapter III. There
is no implication that fixed costs and capacity costs are
identical but rather that capacity costs are sub-set or
sub-category of fixed costs. Certainly a firm may incur
costs of the fixed variety which are in no way related to
capacity. Very few contractors offered a listing of specific
costs which comprise capacity costs, but those who did
included only basic items such as depreciation of plant
and equipment, rent, insurance, and taxes. In analyzing
the responses to this issue, there is an inference that
"capacity costs" was not a normal category in the respond-
ents' cost accounting systems. Many indicated that such a
categorization of costs had little if any significance.
The time span over which capacity should be considered
fixed was judged to be any period in which resources and
business practices remain relatively unchanged. Of those
respondents offering a specific answer, one year or one
complete cost accounting period was considered appropriate.
The determination of which specific costs are linked to
capacity was most popularly accomplished by examining the
behavior of the costs involved. Those that do not vary
with less than major changes in production are capacity
costs. A slight variation of the same concept was that
costs which require a time lag for adjustment in the level
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of expenditure after a substantial volume change are related
to capacity. The basic message is the same one mentioned
earlier: Capacity costs are fixed costs.
Few respondents viewed a difference in utilization from
that which was expected as a problem. Variable costs will
automatically adjust to a level determined by the actual
utilization. Fixed costs will presumably remain at budgeted
levels and the variances generated by the over or under
application of fixed overhead costs must be equitably
allocated to appropriate cost objectives. Other CAS '
s
prescribe the procedures for accomplishing the disposition
of variances.
Since a majority of contractors did not identify capacity-
related costs as a separate category and did not desire to do
so, capacity-related costs can be allocated to final cost
objectives either directly or indirectly through the use of
cost pools in the same way as any other fixed cost. The
allocation must be made on some appropriate measure of
activity. Again, adequate regulations exist to prescribe
the accomplishment of the allocation under the full
absorption concept.
The questions of if and how idle plant costs should be
distributed to production become complicated by the absence
of specific definition. Those costs associated with idle
capacity, earlier defined as facilities temporarily idle
because of a lack of orders and later determined by DAR to
be allowable as a charge to government contracts, are a
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normal cost of business and should be charged to production.
There were no dissenting opinions on this particular issue.
Most respondents agreed that the costs of excess capacity, or
what DAR designated as idle facilities (greater productive
capacity than the company could reasonably expect to use),
should be charged to production as a normal cost or allocated
to special overhead pools for ultimate allocation to all final
cost objectives. Most contractors agreed that DAR, Section
15-205.12, provided adequate regulations for the handling of
the two types of idle plant costs.
The only additional point of significance raised with
respect to this issue was that of standby capacity. It
was suggested that standbv capacity, which is actually excess
capacity maintained for the convenience of the government in
the event of national emergency, be treated as idle capacity.
One respondent suggested that Congress should subsidize,
through appropriations, standby capacity in critical industries
Another suggested that standby capacity costs be deferred to
future production. Regardless of the particular point of
view, most respondents saw the critical issue as one of
allowability of these costs and not allocability . As such, it
was a subject for negotiation with procurement officials and
not for a CAS.
F. WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF INTRODUCING
THE CONCEPT OF FIXED COSTS TO CONTRACT COSTING?
Are they the same as capacity-related costs? What types
of cost could be considered "fixed" for contract costing?
Are all direct costs variable?
Under what circumstances could the parties agree on a
"fixed" portion of each significant indirect cost pool?
Does an activity which is carried on at a fixed level
without regard to changes in production levels (possible




Few respondents, particularly the contractor's group,
could cite any advantages to introducing the concept of
fixed costs to contract costing. Most contractors believed
that it would only result in increased administrative expense
and create more disputes during contract negotiations. Many
believed it to be impractical because of the lack of a clear
distinction between fixed and variable costs. Costs are
generally neither fixed nor variable, even within fairly
narrow ranges of volume. Many companies cited the fact that,
in the long run, all costs were variable. DCAA believed that
introducing this concept would add confusion to a fairly sta-
ble area of understanding and would be an act of replacing
the present full absorption costing approach. Several con-
tractors also felt that such action would be an abrogation of
the full costing concept to which the CA33 is committed.
The few advantages listed were that the action could
facilitate negotiations of overhead rates because the
effect of volume on costs would be clearly indicated and
that the identification of idle capacity costs would be
possible and, thus, would permit a periodic review of the
need for various sources of capacity.
The responses indicated that capacity costs are a
sub-set of fixed costs, as was previously discussed.
There was divided opinion on whether all direct costs are
variable. Some said they were but a majority believed that
the two terms were different types of classifications of
costs. "Variable" denotes cost behavior with respect to
changes in volume or activity. "Direct" denotes a cost
that is applicable to a single cost objective rather than
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multiple cost objectives. Mo st respondents concurred
that contracting parties could agree on a fixed portion
of each significant indirect cost pool if the agreement
was mandatory for the contracting process. Most believed
that agreement would be difficult to reach and would
complicate the negotiation process.
The overall response to this issue of introducing
the concept of fixed costs to contract costing was
negative, indicating a belief that the costs of imple-
mentation would far exceed any benefits realized.
G. WHAT IMPACT ON CONTRACT PRCING TECHNIQUES COULD 3E
EXPECTED IF CAPACITY -RELATED COSTS WERE WELL IDENTIFIED?
If a specific level of capacity utilization could be
forecast, would it be feasible (desirable?) for the
parties to agree on a predetermined share (or amount) of
capacity-related costs for the contract, without regard
to actual capacity performance?
If the contract's portion of fixed cost were thus
predetermined, what would be the implications as to
entrepreneurial risk-taking and therefore as to weighted
guidelines for profit objectives? (Appendix A)
The impact on contract pricing techniques as a result
of identifying capacity-related costs was judged by the
respondents to be minimal or adverse. As might be
expected, the adverse responses were primarily from the
contractor's group. The general opinion of the group was
that it was feasible but not desirable for the contracting
parties to agree to a predetermined share of capacity-
related costs for the contract. Common reasons cited were
that (l) difficulties would appear in properly identif -




(2) the forecast of capacity utilization would be
difficult to make with accuracy, (3) this type of treat-
ment would make negotiated contracts the same as firm,
fixed-price contracts, and (^) current contract pricing
techniques are adequate and no new GAS is needed. The
governmental agencies' and accounting associations'
responses were less negative in tone but generally re-
flected the opinion that the impact on pricing technique
would be minimal. The major reason cited was that
procurement and audit activities should already be aware
of the difference in capacity (fixed) costs andvariable
costs. A major problem area cited was the added admin-
istrative burden and expense to all contracting parties
as a result of the identification and forecasting process.
Several respondents questioned the propriety of the CASB
delving into pricing matters, apparently thinking that it
was a procurement policy, not an accounting, issue.
The subsidiary issue of the implications as to
entrepreneurial risk-taking and weighted guidelines for
profit objectives revealed a surprising dichotomy of
opinion. The respondents generally supported the con-
tention that weighted guidelines for profit objectives
would require adjustment, but opinion was divided on
whether contractor risk would be increased or decreased.
Most non-contractor responses supported the notion of
decreased risk to the contractor. Respondents did not




The problems cited by contractors concerning
difficulties in identifying capacity-related costs and
forecasting capacity utilization were contradicted somewhat
by a small minority of contractor respondents who indicated
that: (l) fixed amounts and ceilings are concepts already
in use for other types of contracts and (2) the use of
predetermined levels of capacity was a concept already in
use by many firms in the development of standard costs.
The minority opinion appeared to suggest that the concept
of fixed cost identification is really not as foreign as
many contractors indicated in their responses.
H. HOW SHOULD PRESENT DEFINITIONS AND POLICIES BE CLARIFIED
OR IMPROVED?
What are the practical techniques appropriate to
identify the point at which idle capacity becomes so
widespread as to warrant identification as idle facilities?
What is the concept of "standby" capacity or facil-
ities? How is this best distinguished from idle capacity
and idle facilities?
What suggestions do you have with regard to definitions?
What changes should be made in costing concepts with
respect to capacity-related costs? (Appendix A)
The issue of how present definitions and policies should
be clarified or improved is so broad that one might expect
a wide variety of responses. Surprisingly, with the
exception of definitional variations, the responses were
much in agreement. To the central issue, the responses,
particularly from the contractors' group, indicated sat-
isfaction with the definitions contained in DAR, Section
15-205.12 and Section 15-205.^2. They saw no need to
alter or add to the definitions and concepts presently in
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use. Only when addressing the subsidiary issues did the
respondents provide new or additional definitions for
capacity costs.
To the subsidiary issue of when does idle capacity
become so widespread as to warrant identification as idle
facilities the responses overwhelmingly indicated that it
was strictly a matter of judgement and that it must be
determined by the contracting parties involved for each
individual case. There are no universally applicable
techniques which are appropriate under all circumstances.
A few specific answers were provided, such as the one from
DOD, which specified that any of the following conditions
should exist in order for idle capacity to be designated
as idle facilities: (1) a facility is completely unused,
(2) no current need for a particular facility can be dem-
onstrated, (3) a. facility has been sub-let, rented, or
abandoned, or (^) a 'facility has been excluded from a
regular maintenance schedule. One contractor offered a time
for consideration by stating that unused facilities in
excess of a contractor's needs for a period of one year
should be designated as idle facilities. It was apparent
that the respondents recognized and utilized the term idle
facilities as defined in DAR, Section 15-205.12, which is
the same as excess capacity discussed in Chapter III.
The concept of "standby" capacity or facilities was the
sub-issue that offered the greatest diversity in responses.
The concept seemed to be understood almost unanimously but
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was defined or expressed with slight variations. The basic
concept was that standby capacity or facilities were repre-
sented by assets either withdrawn or withheld from regular
usage and retained for use as replacements or additions
during breakdowns, emergencies, or other unusual circum-
stances. For some, the term standby connoted probable or
anticipated future use; for others, it suggested a back-up
or ready replacement status. Some respondents considered
standby capacity to be idle capacity that had been designated
by management to be available for use on short notice.
Whatever particular variation of the concept was used,
standby capacity costs were considered to be costs of
production and proper charges to contracts. Standby
capacity was generally considered to be a part of idle
capacity, although it was maintained intentionally rather
than through unplanned circumstances.
A large majority of respondents suggested that the DAR
definitions of idle capacity and idle facilities were
adequate and that no changes were necessary. Most saw no
need to introduce the concept of standby capacity or
facilities. The same large majority of respondents saw no
reason to change the costing concepts with respect to
capacity-related costs. One worthwhile suggestion was
offered by DCAA--to provide illustrations for determining
what is idle capacity and what are idle facilities.
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I. HOW SHOULD CAPACITY-RELATED COSTS 3E CONSIDERED WHEN
IDLENESS IS OCCASIONED BY EXTERNAL HAPPENINGS SUCH
AS CONTRACT CANCELLATIONS OR DELAYS CAUSED 3Y A CUSTOMER,
STRIKES AND NATURAL DISASTERS?
Should capacity-related costs be defined to include
only the costs directly related to physical elements of
capacity (such as maintenance, repair, housing, rent,
property taxes, insurance, and depreciation) or to
include salaries normally included in various indirect
cost pools? In what way, if any, does the cause of the
idleness influence the decision?
For cancellations and delays what consideration should
be given to the availability of other work which could
have used the capacity? Is there a difference between
commercial and Government customers in this regard?
(Appendix A)
Respondents, both contractor and others, generally
agreed that the cost of idle capacity should be borne by
the customer in the case of cancellations and customer
caused delays. Idle capacity caused by strikes and natural
disasters, most agreed, should have the cost allocated to
all cost objectives involved. Several non-contractors
objected to the government paying an abnormally high share
of costs not resulting from government action (i.e., strikes,
disasters, or other normal business risks).
Respondents were not in agreement as to what constituted
capacity-related costs. Some indicated a preference for
including only the physical elements of capacity (such as
maintenance, repair, rent, taxes, insurance, and depreci-
ation); however, a majority preferred to include both
human and physical elements. This implies that salaries
normally included in indirect cost pools are also capacity-
related costs. The cause of the idleness has no bearing
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on the determination of capacity-related costs, only on who
bears the costs.
Most respondents agreed that, when cancellations or
delays occur, the contractor should promptly take all
reasonable action to mitigate the adverse cost effect.
This includes finding alternate uses for resources (capacity),
including the acceleration of back-log work to absorb idle
capacity. Such action should be taken regardless of whether
the customer causing the cancellation or delay is from the
government or commercial arena.
The contractors group, predictably, indicated in many
responses that this whole issue was one of procurement
policy, adequately covered by existing regulations. They
saw no need for the CASB to concern itself with allowability
of costs.
J. WHAT OTHER POINTS SHOULD 3E CONSIDERED?
As indicated in the covering letter, this paper
represents a preliminary exploration by the CASB staff.
The staff will appreciate your suggestions as to
additional issues which should be considered in connection
with capacity-related costs. (Appendix A)
Very few respondents provided other issues to be
considered. The general response was that the issues paper
was too broad and diverse already and that they had nothing
to add. In order to provide as complete a representation
of the responses as possible, the additional issues that
were provided will be listed but without analysis or




(1) The question of the volume at which indirect cost
allocations should be set.
(2) DCAA suggested a standard on "Accounting for Costs
During an Abnormal Production Period," which would cover
both excess capacity costs and other cost allocation problems
peculiar to contract delays, disruptions, and terminations.
(3) Treatment of capacity-related costs in establishing
standard overhead costs.
(41 The product mix of a business unit and the
commercial, fixed-price, and other government business
impact.
(5) Retention' of idle capacity or idle facilities for
use in periods of national emergency.
(6) Accounting treatment of losses resulting from
write-downs of idle facilities to realizable value.
(7) Desirability of maintaining a reasonable level of
idle capacity.
(8) Phase-down costs (i.e. severence costs, reduction-
in-force costs as a result of over capacity from one
contract period to another).
Item (1) from the above list was submitted by an
accounting professor, item (2) from DCAA, and items (3^
through (8) by contractors. Six other contractors used this




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to reach a reasonable conclusion on the
original research objective (the desirability and feasibility
of a formal cost accounting standard on capacity-related
costs), an analysis of two separate decisions is necessary.
First, the desirability question must be addressed. What
benefits would accrue to the contracting parties if a
standard were developed? Would it promote the CAS3*s
objective of increasing uniformity and consistency in
accounting and, thereby, improve understanding and communi-
cation, reduce the incidence of disputes and disagreements,
and facilitate equitable contract settlements? [ 15 J Is this
an appropriate subject for the CA33 to be contemplating as
a formal standard? These are the kinds of questions that
must be considered in connection with the desirability
analysis. Next, a feasibility analysis is appropriate.
Even if it can be determined that good reasons exist for the
development of a standard, the question of whether or not a
standard can be written to accomplish the objective must be
answered. The potential problems of implementation, pre-
cise definitions and measurement of capacity and costs, must
be considered. The costs of developing and implementing a
standard on capacity-related costs must be weighted against
the benefits that may be provided. Certainly, no quanti-




The analysis of the basic research question is
complicated significant ly by several factors:
(1) The impetus or vehicle for the research, the CASE
issues paper, deals with many, not necessarily related,
subjects ranging from specific to very general.
(2) The issues paper deals with many subjects that are
beyond the scope of cost accounting and are specifically in
the area of procurement and contracting policy. Many issues
addressed appear to be concerned with "allowability" rather
than "allocability" of costs for government contracts.
(3) Many respondents provided information to the issues
paper that clearly indicated that they were looking at some-
thing more than a possible change in their accounting
procedures. Rather. +hey viewed the proposal as something
that could affect future contract negotiations and even
profit margins on future negotiated contracts.
(4) The largest single obstacle to the analysis, which
will be discussed in more detail later, is the consideration
of the various issues while remaining within the framework
of the full absorption costing approach, which existing
contracting regulations require. The CASE, of course, is
also committed to full absorption costing.
A. DESIRABILITY ANALYSIS
Why would the CASE want to develop a formal standard on
capacity-related costs? What objectives would be served
by the standard? Although the CAS3 issues paper on capacity-
related costs addresses a wide spectrum of ideas, two basic
concepts are dominant and warrant listing as the primary
issues involved in the establishment of a standard:
(l) The measurement of capacity and the determination
of the costs of that capacity. Included in measurement of




(2) The introduction of the concept of fixed and
variable costs in costing government contracts. This is a
basic concept in cost accounting but one that traditionally
has been ignored in government contract costing.
Concern over the measurement of capacity and its
associated costs is undoubtedly driven by interest in
conserving the financial resources of the federal govern-
ment. The Gansler report discussed in Chapter I cited the
magnitude of the problem— the government payment to
contractors of $300 to 3500 million annually for excess
capacity in the aircraft industry alone ^18 J. No one
knows what the amount might be if all industries were con-
sidered. The expenditure of funds for unnecessary capacity
in a time of spiraling costs and huge deficits in govern-
ment spending should be of concern to government procurement
officials. Few could argue against the idea that those
funds could be well spent in other areas, if they were made
available. There is certainly no implication that some
amount of capacity in excess of current requirements in
industries vital to the well-being of the country is not
necessary. The point remains that excess capacity and its
associated costs need to be identified so that a conscious
decision can be made as to whether or not the government
will support the excess capacity. The method of how the
excess capacity will be supported—either through high-
level government procurement policy or congressionally
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approved subsidies—is not as important as the fact that the
information necessary for decision making could be derived.
The respondents to the issues paper strongly indicated
that a CAS was not necessary and that no problems really
existed so as to require a standard. From the contractors'
standpoint, this is perfectly understandable, because they
could see the issues paper leading to action that would
eventually have an adverse effect on corporate profits.
No one could expect support from those who could see no
benefits for themselves but only reduced profits. The
fact that only minimal support for a standard was received
from the government agencies which responded to the issues
paper was not quite as predictable. The DOB response
relating to capacity-related costs was particularly
significant, since the Gansler report singled out DOD as
bearing the majority of the excess costs of the aircraft
industry. Of course, many of the reasons for opposition or
lack of support for a CAS stem from feasibility or imple-
mentation considerations, problems which will be discussed
later in this chapter.
Many respondents to the issues paper objected to a
standard on capacity-related costs on the basis that it
was unnecessary because DAR provided adequate workable
definitions to cover varying situations. However, an
examination of the applicable sections of DAR reveals fairly
general definitions and concepts. It does contain a basic
policy that costs of idle capacity are allowable as contract
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costs while costs of idle facilities are not. However, the
definitions cannot really be classified as workable. There
are no criteria for the measurement of capacity, no specific
distinction between idle facilities and idle capacity, and
no guidelines or illustrations for the determination of
costs to be associated with capacity. The DAR provisions
appear to be very general guidelines, and the allowability
of capacity-related costs requires negotiations between the
contracting officer and the contractor for each individual
contract. Although the issues paper did not specifically
address the issue of contractor recovery of capacity costs,
an inference was drawn that the contractors were recovering
all of their capacity-related costs by allocating those
costs to final cost objectives, including government con-
tracts. Most contractors indicated that they were aware of
the provisions of DAR that disallowed costs of idle
facilities (excess capacity) as a contract cost; however,
the responses to the question of how idle plant costs should
be distributed to production indicated that they were fully
allocable either directly or through some special overhead
pool. This was interpreted to mean that contractors were
not absorbing any capacity costs but were recovering them
under the full absorption concept. The conclusion must be
drawn that the DAR does not contain adequate provisions to
provide for the proper cost accounting to make the necessary
decisions concerning capacity-related costs. Something more
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is needed, and a CAS is, potentially, an appropriate
vehicle to provide the necessary cost accounting information.
The introduction of the concept of fixed and variable
costs is really a separate issue from the measurement of
capacity? however, it is really a prerequisite if the costs
of capacity, including excess and idle capacity, are to be
determined. The introduction of this concept is certainly
not a revolutionary idea. The Vatter study, which was
prepared for use with and included in the GAO feasibility
study for adopting uniform cost accounting standards, strongly
advocated the distinction between fixed and variable costs.
His contention that cost measurement should be based upon
objective evidence, that cost assignments should be made
only when statistically verifiable, and that equity and
fairness considerations have no place in measuring costs
are just as relevant today as they were in 1969 when the
report was prepared. His contention that it is better to
leave some costs unassigned to final cost objectives and
subject to negotiation, if they cannot be assigned with
statistical confidence, is extremely appealing when con-
sidering the subject of capacity-related costs [l^3»
Why not identify and assign to final cost objectives
(contracts) those costs which can be measured? And why
not negotiate some appropriate portion of the con-
tractors' capacity costs rather than cloud the issue by
allocating fixed costs to final cost objectives and having
volume changes or fluctuations significantly affect the
unit costs? Contracts are already subject to negotiation;
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therefore, negotiating a government payment for capacity-
costs rather than having those costs buried within the
product cost through some arbitrary allocation process
seems quite logical. The only major obstacle to such an
approach is that it is contrary to full absorption costing,
which is the concept in use for government contract costing
and to which the CAS3 is committed. There is no intention
here to conclude that the variable (direct) costing technique
is superior in all aspects to the full absorption technique.
That controversy has remained unresolved for many years and
will likely continue unresolved for many more. The dis-
cussion of these two costing techniques, as contained in
Chapter III, shows that either is perfectly logical when
considered individually and neither is necessarily superior
to the other. There are numerous proponents of both con-
cepts. The important consideration seems to be the use for
which the information is intended. Management should be
aware of the alternatives available in cost accounting
techniques and use whichever is most advantageous for its
purposes. In the case of contract costing, the federal
government has selected the full absorption costing tech-
nique; however, the variable costing technique, with its
distinction between fixed and variable costs, might have some
advantages.
To demonstrate some of the accounting alternatives that
would be available and some of the effects on overall
contract costs that identification of capacity and
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capacity-related costs would allow, consider the following




(1) A contractor produces output solely under
negotiated government contracts.
(2) A CAS on capacity-related costs provides the
criteria to establish the following capacity levels,
volume levels, and costs.
Annual capacity costs total $10 million.
Fixed costs are applied to production based on direct
labor hours (DLH).
Capacity is measured by direct labor hours (DLh).
Theoretical (maximum) capacity 1,300,000
Practical (normal) capacity 1,000,000
Normal volume 750,000
Budgeted (expected actual) volume 500,000
Actual volume 500,000
Excess capacity 250,000
(practical capacity less normal volume)
Idle capacity 250,000
(normal volume less budgeted volume)
Accounting Alternative j#l t Fixed (capacity) costs applied
to production based on expected (budgeted) volume. This
is the oreferred allocation based in accordance with pro-
posed CAS 4-19.
Fixed overhead rate = $10 million + 500,000 DLH = $20/DLH
Actual production = 500,000 DLH
Overhead rate x $20 /DLH
Overhead applied $10,000,000
Variance =
Government share of capacity costs = $10 million
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(Note: If actual volume were less than budgeted
volume, a volume variance would be generated and
would be applied to final cost objectives in the same
proportion as the original allocation of fixed costs.)
Account ing Alternative 42 \ Fixed (capacity) costs applied to
production based on normal volume.
Fixed overhead rate = $10 million t 750,000 DLH =
$13.33/DLH
Actual production = 500,000 DLH
Overhead rate x |13.33/DLK
Overhead applied 36,666,667
Volume variance = 310 million - 36.67 million = 33.33
million
(Note: Volume variance applied to final cost objectives
in the same proportion as original allocation of fixed
costs. )
Government share of capacity costs = 310 million
Accounting Alternative f2 '• Eixed (capacity) costs applied to
production based on practical capacity. Volume variance for
idle and excess capacity allocated to final cost objectives.
Fixed overhead rate = 310 million * 1,000,000 DLH =
310/DLH
Actual oroduction = 500,000 DLH
Overhead rate x 310 / DLH
Overhead applied 35,000,000
Idle capacity variance = 32.5 million
Excess capacity variance = 2.5 million
(Note: Both idle capacity variance and excess capacity
variance allocated to final cost objectives.)
Government share of capacity costs = 310 million
Accounting Alternative §k \ Fixed (capacity) costs applied
to production based on practical capacity. Volume variance
for idle capacity allocable to final cost objectives, volume
variance for excess capacity not allocable.
Fixed overhead rate = 310 million • 1,000,000 = 310/DLH
Actual production = 500,000 DLH
Overhead rate x 310 /DLH
Overhead applied 35, 000,000
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Idle capacity variance = 32.5 million
Excess capacity variance = 2.5 million
Government share of capacity costs = 37.5 million
Accounting Alternative t5 • Fixed (capacity) costs applied
to production based on practical capacity. Neither volume
variance for idle capacity nor excess capacity allocable
to final cost objectives.
Fixed overhead rate «$10 million f 1,000,000 DLH =
310/DLH
Actual production = 500,000 DLH
Overhead rate x $10 /DLH
Overhead applied $5,000,000
Idle capacity variance = 32.5 million
Excess capacity variance = 2.5 million
Government share of capacity costs = 35 million
Accounting Alternative £6 : Fixed (capacity) costs are not
ape-lied to production; they are negotiated.
Government share of capacity costs = negotiable
The preceding accounting alternatives are not intended
to represent all possible alternatives but only those in
common use and those that could be used if a functional
CAS could be developed. Alternative ,fl represents the simplest
and most direct method of allocating fixed costs. As long
as actual volume equals expected volume, all fixed costs are
allocated directly to final cost objectives and no variance
exists. Alternative #2 basically is the same concept except
for the introduction of a volume variance because actual
volume is less than normal volume. Neither of the first two
alternatives even considers total capacity, and both charge
the government for all fixed (capacity) costs. Starting
with alternative #3, capacity is recognized as a basis for
allocating capacity costs and, in the example, the variance
increases significantly. However, alternative #3 uses the
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full absorption costing approach; and the government's share
of the capacity costs remains unchanged. One advantage of
this alternative is that idle capacity and excess capacity
costs are, at least, identified. Alternative ,t^ adds the
procurement policy decision that costs of excess capacity
are not allowable as contract costs and, therefore, reduces
the government's share of capacity costs by $2.5 million.
Alternative §5 represents the most extreme position in
favor of the government and provides the government's
lowest share of capacity costs. This alternative allows
contractors to recover capacity costs for only that portion
of capacity currently utilized. Alternative ,?6 was included
as the alternative suggested by the Vatter study. The
important point is that alternatives 3. ^, 5» and 6 are not
possible without the information contained in the
assumptions— information that is not available presently
under the existing cost accounting procedures required of
contractors and will not be available unless a CAS can be
written that will allow the determination of the necessary
capacity levels and costs. Whether or not the CAS can be
written and implemented is the subject of the feasibility
analysis in the next section, but, at least, the questions
of benefit to the government and the propriety of the CASS
dealing with the subject have been addressed and answered
favorably in some respects. The benefit to the government
is a potential savings of millions of dollars annually
in excess capacity costs, and it appears to be perfectly
77

proper for the CASB to write a standard that would provide
the appropriate cost accounting data to permit contracting
officers to enforce the provisions of DAR. However, it is
extremely doubtful that the CASB objectives of improved
understanding and communication, reduced incidence of
disputes and disagreements, and equitable contract settle-
ments would be accomplished by a standard on capacity-
related costs. In fact, the responses to the issues paper
indicated that such a CAS would have just the opposite effect.
There were really no potential benefits for the contractors
identified in this study.
3. FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
The determination of the feasibility of developing a
CAS on capacity-related costs is a highly judgmental process,
because the benefits must be weighted against the costs and
neither benefits nor costs can be quantified. The feasi-
bility question will, with some exceptions, have to be
answered by relying heavily on the responses to the issues
paper. Information in Chapter III on capacity-related costs
is important to the consideration, but most of that infor-
mation is theoretical in nature. It is important because
it provides a background and offers different perspectives
on various issues. However, it is the responses to the
issues paper that provide the best available information on
the specific issues of capacity-related costs and govern-
ment contract costing. In analyzing the responses, it must
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be kept in mind that contractors and contracting officers
have different objectives and that the responses were
generally provided from a particular viewpoint. It would
be too much to ask that all respondents be completely
objective in their responses.
The feasibility question has several important factors,
the most significant of which are the measurement problems
that are anticipated by many of the respondents. A majority
of the respondents, both contractor and others, did not
believe that a standard could be written that would have
applicability to the wide spectrum of defense contractors.
The difficulty is not in developing adequate conceptual
definitions for capacity levels and capacity costs.
Although differences and variations exist, those could be
resolved fairly easily. The definitions developed in
Chapter III could serve appropriately. The problem arises
when an attempt is made to quantify a specific defined
level, such as practical capacity. It is subject to too
many variables to be measured like the volume of a container.
Capacity is not static; capacity places an upper limit on
production but only as long as all conditions are fixed.
Additional shifts, overtime, the contracting-out of work,
and other actions can affect capacity. Added to those
problems is the human element of non-specific productive
capacity.
Establishing a quantitative level for capacity is
difficult enough, but not nearly difficult as distinguishing
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between idle and excess capacity. P/!ore questions than
answers appear when those two concepts are considered.
Excess capacity was defined earlier as greater productive
capacity than the company can reasonably expect to use.
The term "reasonably" implies that judgement or negotiation
must be employed to measure excess capacity. The problem
with designating unused capacity as either idle or excess
is that future demand for a company ' s products is a factor
in the determination process. Suppose, for example, that a
company expands its facilities in anticipation of increased
demand for its products. 3ut suppose also that the increased
demand is not realized or that the increase was less than
expected. Is the unused capacity to be designated as idle
or excess? The company would be justified in classifying the
unused capacity as idle if the idleness is considered to be
temporary and the increased demand will eventually be
realized. If, on the other hand, there is uncertainty as to
whether the increased demand will ever be realized, then
classification as idle or excess capacity becomes a matter of
judgement; and either alternative might be defended.
An almost insurmountable problem seems to exist when
considering developing a CAS that would enable an accurate
measurement of capacity for all companies. Each industry
is different and each company within an industry is unique
with respect to operating practices. Each would require
specific sets of criteria in order to measure capacity
accurately. Obviously, developing specific criteria for
SO

each government contractor is impractical because of the
large number of companies involved. The only reasonable
choices are either no standard at all or one that is worded
in such general terms as to provide no real guidance in
individual cases.
Not quite as severe as the capacity measurement problem
is the issue of cost determination. Most companies already
distinguish between fixed and variable costs, direct and
indirect costs, and other classifications of costs. The use
of flexible budgets, standard costs and the variable (direct
costing technique for management use is not uncommon in
industry. All of these uses require a distinction between
fixed and variable costs and some understanding of capacity
costs. Although the contractors expressed some valid
objections to introducing the concept of fixed costs to
contract costing (such as the lack of a clear distinction
between fixed and variable costs), the concept is so widely
understood and utilized in cost accounting systems that it
is suggested here that those objections may have been
exaggerated.
One area that might present significant difficulty is
the association of capacity costs with various levels of
capacity. In the example used in the desirability analysis,
there was an implied assumption that the relationship be-
tween capacity and capacity costs was linear. The
assumption was that if capacity costs for 1,000,000 DLK
was $10,000,000, the appropriate share of capacity costs
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for $750,000 ELK was -57,500,000. This linear relationship
is not likely. It is more likely that the costs to
provide capacity of 750,000 DLK would be less than the cost
of providing 1,000,000 DLK of capacity, but not proportion-
ately less. Twenty-five percent less capacity might result
in five to ten percent less costs. Of course, the situation
would vary with each individual production facility. It is
doubtful that a standard could be written that would allow
for the accurate measurement of the costs applicable to the
various levels of capacity.
Another consideration for the development of a standard
is whether or not the principle of full absorption costing
for government contracts is to be rigorously adhered to in
the future. This really is not as much a feasibility
consideration as it is one of practicality. If all costs
are to be allocated to final cost objectives, then, as was
demonstrated in the accounting examples, the government's
share of capacity costs is the same. As was stated earlier,
additional information would be available; but, without
some tangible benefits, the development of a standard would
seen inappropriate.
The strongest objection to the CASB study on capacity-
related costs was that a standard in that area would cause
accounting procedures to become unduly complex and result
in excessive administrative costs. This view is accepted
and considered to be pertinent to the feasibility study.
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Certainly, the modifications to cost accounting systems, the
added reporting requirements, increased negotiations, and
settlement of disputes over the issue would be costly.
How great a cost would be involved is not a question that
can be answered at this time; however, it seems safe to
assume that the costs would be borne by the government
through the allocation of indirect costs to final cost
objectives.
Even if a standard were developed for capacity-related
costs, there is the question of whether or not contracting
officers could administer it effectively. The LMI report
cited in Chapter II indicated that a major problem of CAS's
is the difficulty contracting officers experience in exe-
cuting CAS requirements. The average contracting officer
lacks the formal accounting education required and generally
has not received adequate training and guidance. Since the
area of capacity-related costs is a highly theoretical one,
administration problems could certainly be expected.
When all factors are considered, it does not appear
feasible to write a cost accounting standard on capacity-
related costs that could achieve the necessary objectives.
The issue of accurate measurement of capacity levels would
have to be resolved before a CAS would have any real signifi-
cance. It is quite conceivable that industrial engineering
studies could establish a practical capacity level for a
particular firm; however, designating unused capacity as
idle or excess is beyond the scope of any type of precise
S3

measurement technique. The distinction between idle and
excess capacity is difficult to make because it is really
an economic concept and is subject to too many variables
to allow accurate, quantitative measurement. The strong
opposition evidenced by the responses to the issues paper
is a clear indication that significant implementation
problems would occur. It is quite possible that the writing
of the standard, the implementation of the standard, the
interpretation actions, and the resolutions of disputes
between contractors and contracting officers might combine
to cause greater costs to the government than any benefits
that might be realized.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
(l) Although a CAS on capacity-related costs may not be
the solution to excess capacity costs to the government,
the problem still exists. It is, therefore, recommended
that contracting officials focus on this problem and attempt
to generate more studies on excess capacity, such as the
Gansler study. Although a precise measurement of excess
capacity may be impossible, it may be feasible through
objective, independent studies to identify widespread excess
capacity in specific industries. If this can be accomplished,
overhead rates and profit guidelines for negotiated con-
tracts could be modified downward. If appropriate higher
authority determines that some amount of excess capacity is
necessary, then that issue should be addressed separately.
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(2) If the CASB is to continue with studies such as the
one on capacity-related costs, some relaxation of the full
absorption costing approach is necessary. The advantages of
other concepts such as variable (direct) costing are too
widely known and recognized in the field of accounting to
be disregarded by the CASB. It seems to be obvious that
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The Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) is charged with the
responsibility of promulgating "cost-accounting standards designed
to achieve uniformity and consistency in the cost-accounting
principles followed by defense contractors and subcontractors under
Federal contracts." In furtherance of this responsibility, the
Staff of the CASB has undertaken a study to explore the basic
issues relating to the treatment of capacity-related costs for
contract costing purposes.
This paper solicits your response to a number of issues. If
you believe that there are other important issues relating to
accounting for capacity-related costs which are not mentioned in
the attached issues paper, we would appreciate your bringing them
to our attention. Also if you, as a Government contractor, have
experienced significant problems related to accounting for capacity-
related costs, we would like to know the circumstances.
Your cooperation and assistance in our research effort is
appreciated. Please let us know if you regard any information
furnished to be privileged or confidential.
We would appreciate your response by January 31, 1979.
there is any matter you would like to discuss, please call








ISSUES RELATED TO A POSSIBLE
COST ACCOUNTING STANDARD
ACCOUNTING FOR CAPACITY-RELATED COSTS
*****
INTRODUCTION
This paper is part of a research effort undertaken by the staff
of the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) dealing with capacity-
related costs. This study involves inquiry into the procurement and
accounting concepts which are involved in measurement of capacity
and utilization rates. A going concern must have resources, both
physical and human, in order to be able to perform on a contract.
The continuing costs of having an available capability may be called
capacity costs.
One of the points to be studied is whether it is desirable and
feasible to develop additional definitions for these concepts.
Within this paper we are using terms as they are used in existing
regulations; we will, however, be interested in your comments on ways
in which the present terminology might be improved. Some accountants
use the terms "fixed cost" and "capacity cost" almost interchangeably.
A cost which does not vary with business volume is considered to be a
fixed cost. Such costs are not fixed in the sense that they do not
fluctuate or vary; they vary, but from causes independent of volume.
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These other causes are frequently related to short term or long term
decisions about capacity. The present CASB research project Involves
an Inquiry Into the distinction, 1f any, between "capacity-related"
and "fixed" costs.
The general Idea of capacity-related costs 1s well recognized 1n
management accounting, but Its applicability 1s not clear under the
full absorption approach which has been used over the years for con-
tract costing. The present CASB research project inquires into possible
techniques for defining capacity, for measuring capacity, and for relat-
ing costs to capacity, all within the general framework of full absorption
costing.
This research includes inquiry into the conceptual nature of idle
capacity, which is typically considered to be a part of the normal
fluctuations of the rate at which capacity 1s utilized. Many people
feel that Idle capacity, if widespread throughout a facility, may
warrant special attention 1n cost accounting. This research includes
inquiries into the nature of the situations which would indicate when
"normal" idleness has been exceeded.
Some analysts classify capacity costs in two categories, "committed
costs" and "managed costs." Costs in the committed category may be
represented by housing, rent, property taxes, insurance, depreciation,
and similar costs. Once established, the annual levels of costs for
these elements may remain stable for long periods of time. The managed




advertising; the function can be staffed by salaried employees or
provided by purchase of service. Costs of this category may vary
in response to decisions made from year to year or even within
shorter time periods. This CASB research effort inquires into both
categories of capacity-related costs, with particular reference to
the contract costing environment.
ISSUES
The CASB staff will be interested in your opinions on the broad
issues which are presented below. The subsidiary questions are
intended to show the nature of the overall points under consideration;
there is no requirement to reply to all of them.
1. What is the conceptual nature of capacity?
a. Does the concept of capacity apply only to manufacturing
facilities? Under what circumstances does it apply to a research
laboratory? To a warehouse? To service industries?
b. Does the concept of physical capacity of a facility differ
from the concept of productive capacity of humans? If so, how?
2. How should capacity be measured?
a. With respect to physical facilities, what is the appro-
priate level for identification of capacity? Under what circumstances
should it be the business unit? Cost center? Assembly line? Is the
capacity of each physical resource relevant or should capacity only be
measured for groups of resources?
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b. What business practices need to be specified (or assumed)
1a defining capacity? (5-day week? multi-shift? preventive main-
tenance policy? prevalence of overtime?)
c. What circumstances determine the appropriate unit of
measure? (e.g. machine hours, units of output?) How about unit
of measure for capacity of human resources?
3. How are costs (direct and indirect) linked to capacity?
a. Over what time span should capacity be considered to be
fixed?
b. How do you determine which specific costs are linked to
capacity?
c. What happens if utilization differs from that which was
expected?
d. How can capacity-related costs be treated under a full
absorption concept? Under what circumstances should idle plant
costs be distributed to production? What are the alternatives?
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of introducing the
concept of fixed costs to contract costing?
a- Are they the same as capacity-related costs? What types
of cost could be considered "fixed" for contract costing? Are all
direct costs variable?
b. Under what circumstances could the parties agree on a
"fixed" portion of each significant indirect cost pool?
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c. Does an activity which is carried on at a fixed level
without regard to changes in production levels (possible example:
research laboratory) represent a fixed cost?
5. What impact on contract pricing techniques could be expected
if capacity-related costs were well identified?
a. If a specific level of capacity utilization could be
forecast, would it be feasible (desirable?) for the parties to agree
on a predetermined share (or amount) of capacity-related costs for the
contract, without regard to actual capacity utilization during contract
performance?
b. If the contract's portion of fixed cost were thus pre-
determined, what would be the implications as to entrepreneurial risk-
taking and therefore as to weighted guidelines for profit objectives?
6. How should present definitions and policies be clarified or
improved?
a. What are the practical techniques appropriate to identify
the point at which idle capacity becomes so widespread as to warrant
identification as idle facilities.
b. What is the concept of "standby" capacity or facilities?
How is this best distinguished from idle capacity and idle facilities?
c. What suggestions do you have with regard to definitions?
d. What changes should be made in costing concepts with




7. How should capacity-related costs be considered when idleness
te occasioned by external happenings such as contract cancellations or
delays caused by a customer, strikes and natural disasters?
a. Should capacity-related costs be defined to include only
the costs directly related to physical elements of capacity (such as
maintenance, repair, housing, rent, property taxes, insurance, and
depreciation) or to Include salaries normally Included in various
indirect cost pools? In what way, if any, does the cause of the
idleness influence the decision?
b. For cancellations and delays what consideration should be
given to the availability of other work which could have used the
capacity? Is there a difference between commercial and Government
customers in this regard?
8. What other points should be considered? As Indicated in the
covering letter, this paper represents a preliminary exploration by
the CASB staff. The staff will appreciate your suggestions as to
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